


STAT

Approved For Release 2005/05/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007800340001-8

Approved For Release 2005/05/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007800340001-8

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/05/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007800340001-8
TOP SECRET



14 August 1964



25X1


Copy No. C 128



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

DIA and DOS review(s)
completed.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY



25X1

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING
AND DECLASSIFICATION

Approved For Release 2005/05/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007800340001-8

TOP SECRET

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/05/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007800340001-8

Approved For Release 2005/05/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007800340001-8

14 August 1964

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN


CONTENTS



25X1

4. South Vietnam: General Minh will resist Khanh's plans to remove him. (Page 5)
5. Pakistan: Ayub says Pakistan plans to re-examine its ties with SEATO. (Page 6)
6. Brazil: Growing dissatisfaction of some military leaders with Castello Branco. (Page 7)

7. Notes:



25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/05/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007800340001-8

Next 6 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2005/05/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007800340001-8

South Vietnam: [General Minh intends to resist General Khanh's plans to send him abroad as part of a major government reorganization.]

[On 12 August Minh told Ambassador Taylor "in no uncertain terms" that he would not leave South Vietnam in time of war. He said that if anyone wanted his present job as chief of state, he would gladly exchange it "for a gun to use against the Viet Cong."]]

[Earlier the same day Khanh confirmed to Taylor his intention to carry out both structural and personnel changes in the government, including installing himself as president and Defense Minister Khiem as vice president in charge of military affairs. Khanh said that a provisional constitution is already being drafted which provides for these changes and for a new 150-man assembly in which about 60 members would make up a "loyal opposition."]]

[The projected reorganization is in part the result of pressures on Khanh from various assertive military factions, including backers of General Khiem. As a result, obstructionism on the part of Minh probably could not prevent it from being carried out. If Minh refuses to leave South Vietnam, however, he might increasingly become a focal point for opposition to the government.]]

25X1

14 Aug 64

DAILY BRIEF

5

Pakistan: [President Ayub has elaborated on his government's intimations that it is reassessing its foreign policy.]

[Ayub told Ambassador McConaughy on 10 August that only a re-examination of Pakistan's ties with SEATO is in question at this time. He said SEATO has no intrinsic value to Pakistan, and that Pakistan is "embarrassed" by its inability to pull its weight in the organization because of its "liabilities nearer home"--i. e., India.]

[Ayub carefully avoided the suggestion, however, that Pakistan would withdraw from CENTO or that it would cancel its various bilateral security agreements with the US. Ayub offered to make "any contribution" to the US itself which the US "needed or thought might be useful," but reiterated that Pakistan could commit nothing to South Vietnam or any other government in Southeast Asia.]

25X1

14 Aug 64

DAILY BRIEF

6

Brazil: President Castello Branco's government is encountering increasing dissatisfaction among self-styled "hard-line" military leaders.

These officers charge that politicians linked with the Goulart regime are gradually regaining a dominant voice in Brazil and are subverting the goals of the April revolution. A group headed by two leaders of the revolution, Generals Alves Bastos and Mourao Filho, apparently plans to issue a manifesto urging Castello Branco to assume near-dictatorial powers to reverse this trend.

The dissident movement, although still representing only a minority of the officer corps, appears to have the support of many army and naval officers of middle rank.

Castello Branco reacted sharply to such criticism in a speech on 8 August, in which he reaffirmed his intention to follow democratic procedures. However, because of the growing discontent he may reluctantly accede to some of the demands of the hard-liners--possibly including the removal of Sao Paulo Governor Adhemar de Barros, who is under investigation for corruption.

25X1

14 Aug 64

DAILY BRIEF

7

25X1

NOTES

Communist China - USSR: [Peiping's imports of Soviet petroleum products may drop below ten percent of its total requirements in 1964. POL shipments to China dropped from 1.86 million tons in 1962 to 1.41 million tons in 1963 and

25X1

[redacted] in 1964 will drop to 450,000 tons. An expansion of domestic production of crude oil and greater refinery capacity will enable Peiping to meet most of its requirements in 1964, but China remains dependent on the Soviet Union for nearly all its aviation gasoline, jet fuel, and high quality lubricants.]

25X1

Rumania: Rumania is dragging its feet on the USSR's latest ploy in the Sino-Soviet dispute. The 10 August edition of Pravda, which contains the Soviet proposal for a preparatory meeting of the 26 Communist parties, is not available in Bucharest, while the 11 August issue has already been circulated there. The Rumanian press has also been careful not to mention the CPSU's 15 June letter to Peiping and the statements about the meeting by other Communist parties.

14 Aug 64

DAILY BRIEF

8

25X1

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

THE PRESIDENT

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Counsel to the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Administrator

The Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

The National Security Agency

The Director

The United States Information Agency

The Director

The National Indications Center

The Director

Approved For Release 2005/05/17 : CIA-RDP75A007800340001-8

~~TOP SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2005/05/17 : CIA-RDP75A007800340001-8

~~TOP SECRET~~